Despite anecdotal evidence that the quality of governance in recipient countries affects the allocation of international health aid, there is no quantitative evidence on the magnitude of this effect, or on which dimensions of governance influence donor decisions. We measure health aid flows over 1996-2006 for 131 aid recipients, matching aid data with measures of different dimensions of governance and a range of country-specific economic and health characteristics.
INTRODUCTION
Recipient country governance can play a key role in determining both the volume and efficiency of international aid to finance health expenditure (Walt et al., 1999; Jha et al., 2002; Labonte and Spiegel, 2003; Godal, 2005; Cohen, 2006; Bate, 2007) . Making further aid conditional on improvements in recipient governance is recommended not only for general economic aid (Collier and Dollar, 2001 ), but also for health aid (Périn and Attaran, 2003) . While empirical evidence on the impact of governance on aid effectiveness is mixed (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Easterly, 2003; McGillivray, 2003) , many donors now work on the assumption that bad governance leads to a low return on their aid dollars, and some have put policies in place that are designed to redirect aid towards recipients with good governance. The US Millennium Challenge Account is an example of such conditionality (Nowels, 2003) . Although the explicit linking of aid allocations to governance in the Millennium Challenge Account has only been in place since 2004, there is evidence that global aid allocations have been a function of governance since the end of the Cold War period. Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) and Dollar and Levin (2006) find such evidence in total aid allocations, although there is no study specifically on health aid. This paper addresses three issues, the first of which is the extent to which governance has actually affected the distribution of health aid. Despite anecdotal evidence that governance has been important in determining the volume of health aid flows, there has been no attempt to quantify the size of the effect.
The second issue relates to the relative importance of different dimensions of governance in influencing the size of a country"s aid receipts. There are now several indices measuring the quality of a recipient country"s public sector institutions. For example, Kaufmann et al. (2007) provide three such indices, including a "Control of Corruption" index measuring the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain or has been captured by elites and private interests, as well as two broader indicators of institutional quality. However, institutional quality is not the only dimension of governance. Kaufmann et al. also report an index of political rights, "Voice and Accountability", which measures the breadth of participation in selecting a government and freedom of expression and association. In addition, they report an index of civil rights, "Rule of Law", measuring the quality and fairness of contract and law enforcement. This paper makes use of these data to estimate the relative importance of different dimensions of governance in determining aid flows.
A donor has two possible motives for making aid conditional on institutional quality.
Firstly, poor institutions (and possibly weak civil rights) make effective healthcare difficult and costly to deliver, so there is a utilitarian case for directing health aid to recipients with strong institutions. Secondly, as in the Millennium Challenge Account, the allocation of health aid can be used as an incentive for institutional reform, even if the reform does not directly improve the efficiency of healthcare expenditure. Either motive could explain an observed correlation between aid allocation and institutional quality. In contrast, political rights are less likely to have a direct impact on aid effectiveness, although they may have an indirect impact if they lead to better public sector institutions. Existing evidence suggests that the effects of democracy on economic efficiency are indirect (Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2006) . Therefore, conditional on a certain level of institutional quality, a correlation between aid allocation and political rights is more likely to arise from the second motive.
The third issue to be addressed relates to the fungibility of health aid. If aid in general is fungible, then the fraction of aid that donors apportion to the health budget is of little material consequence, however it is determined. If an increase in health aid leads to a reduction in health expenditure by the recipient government (and a corresponding increase in expenditure in other areas) then it makes more sense to model total aid expenditure, rather than health aid alone.
Existing evidence on aid fungibility is mixed (Feyzioglu et al., 1998) .
We address these three issues using a panel data set recording annual levels of health expenditure and their correlates; the dataset comprises most developing countries over the period 1996-2006. Firstly, we identify factors that explain the variation of health aid across developing countries and over time. We allow for the fact that a large proportion of the crosscountry variation in aid can be explained by differences in economic or epidemiological need, or differences in the size of past aid budgets. Conditional on these factors, we measure the extent to which different dimensions of governance impact on health aid. Secondly, we quantify the response of recipient governments to changes in the level of health aid over time. We find that in general health aid exhibits little fungibility, and therefore the volume of health aid is important in its own right, independently of other parts of the aid budget.
EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN HEALTH AID: DATA AND METHODS
Our main data source, which reports annual health aid flows to individual developing countries over 1996-2006, is the WHO National Health Accounts (NHA) database (www.who.int/nha/en).
The compilation of this database is discussed by Poullier et al. (2002) . Accounts are constructed annually for most UN member states. They disaggregate total health expenditure into private expenditure, tax-funded expenditure, expenditure funded by compulsory social security payments and externally funded expenditure. The final category comprises all domestic health expenditure funded by overseas agents; we designate this category "health aid". The main part of our paper is a model of the variation in the level of health aid across counties and over time.
The WHO uses several hundred different sources of data to compile the accounts. For OECD countries, the main source of information is the annual publication OECD Health Data, which provides consistent estimates of a wide range of different types of health expenditure for member states. A further 30 developing countries produce NHA reports, which are usually based on a standard WHO template. Reports often cover data for more than one year, but few of the countries produce a report every year, so some observations are extrapolated. For other countries, NHA reports are not produced and so the WHO infers the missing data from a wide variety of sources, such as national statistical yearbooks, expenditure reports by various government ministries, reports by NGOs and international funding agencies, the IMF Government Financial Statistics, and other UN sources.
The WHO indicates that the data from the OECD and from individual countries" NHA reports are broadly consistent and generally reliable. However, the quality of the data from other sources is highly variable. The WHO World Health Report describes the data from some countries as being "derived from limited sources". Altogether, there are 135 low-and middleincome countries with data that are not suspect in this way. Of these, four Pacific island microstates -the Cook Islands, Nauru, Niue and Palau, all with populations below 25,000 -lack data on some of the explanatory variables to be used in our model. This leaves us with a 12-year sample of 131 countries, listed in Table I . The dataset includes figures for a further ten low-and middle-income countries with data from "limited sources"; these are also listed in the table. The results reported in the main text are based on the 131-country sample, but results from the full 141-country dataset are reported in an appendix, as discussed below.
[ Table I The governance variables are as follows.
1. Institutional quality. This is measured by the "Control of Corruption" scores in Kaufmann et al. (2007) . A higher value indicates better quality public sector institutions.
Other, broader measures of institutional quality are reported in Kaufmann et al. We do not report the regression equations incorporating these alternative measures, but do discuss them briefly in the results section below.
2. Political rights. These are measured by the "Voice and Accountability" scores in Kaufmann et al. (2007) .
3. Civil rights. These are measured by the "Rule of Law" scores in Kaufmann et al. (2007) .
[Tables II-III here]
Since we are using annual panel data, it is quite likely that our aid variable will exhibit some persistence over time. Donors may be slow to respond to changes in recipient characteristics; in this case, the current level of aid (aid it ) will depend on its past level (aid it-1 ).
1 This means that we must use a dynamic panel model to explain the variation in aid it . This model is formulated as: The lagged dependent variable in equation (1) will be correlated with the panel fixed effects, so OLS estimates of the parameters will be biased. We therefore fit equation (1) using the estimator derived by Blundell and Bond (1998) . Our results will depend on assumptions about which of the right-hand-side variables are strictly exogenous, which are predetermined (responding to ln(aid) with a lag), and which are endogenous. In the results reported in the main 1 Although our regression analysis reveals some degree of persistence in aid flows, it is clear that the annual health flow data are stationary. Application of the panel unit root test of Im et al. (2002) to ln(aid) produces a t-bar statistic of -2.63. In a sample of our dimensions, this indicates that the null of a unit root can be rejected at the 1% level. 2 The low correlation of HIV prevalence with the other health indicators suggests that this variable might reflect a different dimension of a country"s overall health status. However, the addition of HIV prevalence to a regression including one of the other health indicators produces a statistically insignificant coefficient.
text, we assume that ln(dom), ln(income) and ln(health) are all endogenous to ln(aid); other variables are treated as exogenous. The results of regressions with alternative assumptions about exogeneity are reported in the appendix, as discussed below. Table IV reports the estimated parameters of equation (1) in which the sample is extended to include countries with data of limited quality, and results in which ln(income) and ln(health) are assumed to be predetermined instead of endogenous. The results in all of these tables are broadly similar to those in Table IV . In general, our conclusions are robust to the alternative model specifications.
[ Table IV here] 3.1 Results regarding persistence Table IV indicates that there is a substantial degree of persistence in aid flows, with a significantly positive regression coefficient on lagged aid. If there is a change in one of the other recipient characteristics, such as income, then aid levels will adjust only slowly in response. The estimated coefficient varies little across the six alternative regressions, and is in the range 0.55-0.59. This means that the eventual percentage increase in health aid resulting from a permanent change in one of the recipient characteristics is nearly twice as large as the initial percentage increase.
Indicators of need and health aid
Each of the coefficients on the six alternative health indicators is significantly greater than zero, although the significance levels do vary. The least precise estimates are on childhood mortality (significant at 10%) and HIV prevalence (significant at 5%). The other four coefficients are significant at the 1% level. There is some variation in the size of the coefficients, which should be interpreted in the light of the standard deviations in Table II . The smallest estimated effect is with HIV prevalence. A 0.1 standard deviation increase in this health indicator -that is, a 17%
increase in prevalence -is predicted to increase health aid by 3.2%. (This is the immediate effect; the eventual effect will be nearly twice as large.) The largest estimate is with neonatal mortality: a 0.1 standard deviation increase in this health indicator -that is, a 7% increase in mortality -is predicted to increase health aid by 8.6%. These figures indicate that on average donors do respond to variations in recipient need, as captured by our health indicators. However, as we will see, this is not the only criterion used in aid allocation decisions.
Table IV also shows that higher levels of recipient income per capita are associated with higher levels of aid. There is some variation in the estimated income elasticity across the different regressions (from 0.42 to 0.83), and in only one case -with TB prevalence as the health indicator -is the coefficient significant at the 5% level. One interpretation of this coefficient is that a higher level of income increases the effectiveness and ease of delivery of health aid, so that when two recipients have the same health status the one with a higher income level will receive more aid. However, this effect is not very precisely estimated, so the result should be treated with some caution.
There is also a large coefficient on population size, significantly less than zero in all regressions except the one incorporating TB prevalence. A 10% increase in population size is estimated to reduce per capita health aid by almost 3%, ceteris paribus. On average, smaller countries do benefit from higher per capita aid levels. It is possible that this reflects a political motivation on the part of some donors, although the average unit cost of health service delivery is likely to be larger in smaller countries.
Finally, the coefficients on domestically funded health expenditure are always negative.
On average, health aid is lower in countries which are spending more of their own money on health. However, the effect is statistically significant only in the regressions incorporating HIV prevalence and TB prevalence, and there is rather more variation in the size of this coefficient across the six regressions than there is in the sizes of the other coefficients. The regression incorporating HIV prevalence indicates that a 10% increase in domestically funded health expenditure will reduce health aid receipts by over 5%, but, the size of the effect in the other regressions is somewhat smaller.
Governance and health aid
The results in Table IV incorporate measures of three different dimensions of governance, as captured by voice, rule and control. There are significant positive correlations across these three dimensions, as illustrated in Figures 1-3 . However, the correlations are far from perfect: a substantial number of countries perform well in one dimension but not in another. Some relatively authoritarian countries have a low level of corruption, for example the mountain kingdom of Bhutan, and some democracies suffer high corruption levels, for example the Marshall Islands, blacklisted by G7 countries for persistent money-laundering. Figure 1 illustrates these two cases. The correlations across the different dimensions of governance mean that the standard errors on the regression coefficients on these variables may be slightly inflated.
However, the correlations are low enough for the variables to capture empirically distinct recipient characteristics.
[ Figures 1-3 here] Table IV shows that voice is a significant determinant of health aid. There is very little variation in the estimated size of the effect across the six regressions: the voice coefficient is always very close to 0.5 and significant at the 1% level. The sample standard deviation in voice is 0.83, so a 0.1 standard deviation increase in this variable is estimated to raise health aid by over 4%. By contrast, rule has no significant impact on aid flows: the t-ratio on the rule coefficient always falls well below the 10% confidence level.
Finally, control is a significant determinant of health aid in five out of the six regressions. In these five regressions, the point estimate of the control coefficient is between 0.4 and 0.5. The sample standard deviation in control is 0.62, so a 0.1 standard deviation increase in this variable is estimated to raise health aid by about 2-3%. If control is replaced by one of the broader measures of institutional quality from Kaufmann et al. then the resulting regression coefficients are always statistically insignificant. It seems to be corruption in particular rather than weak institutions in general that influences the flow of aid.
Trends in health aid
The estimated year fixed effects  t are very similar in all the regressions. They are depicted in [ Figure 4 here]
THE RESPONSE OF DOMESTIC HEALTH SPENDING TO HEALTH AID
If health aid is fully fungible, then the results of the previous section are of limited interest.
Domestic expenditure on health and other items will depend only on the total aid budget; changes in the proportion of the aid budget allocated to health can be exactly offset by changes in domestic financing, and therefore need have no impact on total health spending in the recipient country.
In order to explore the degree of health aid fungibility, we now focus on regressions explaining the variation in ln(dom), using the same data as in the previous section. The regression equations are of the form:
where  i is a panel fixed effect and  t a time fixed effect;  it is random error term. Other terms in equation (2) are as in equation (1). The  parameters are estimated in the same way as the  parameters in equation (1), and selected parameters are reported in Table V. (Parameters  3 ,  5 ,  6 and  7 are never statistically significant, and are not reported.) The model on which our estimates are based assumes that ln(aid), ln(income) and ln(health) are endogenous to ln(dom).
Before discussing the estimates of  1 , which provide evidence on fungibility, we summarize the other salient features of our results. in the six regressions, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable ranges between 0.75 and 0.85. Correspondingly, the estimated short-run income elasticities range between 0.15 and 0.25, and the sum of the coefficients  0 and  2 is always very close to unity. This implies that in the long run domestically funded health expenditure is approximately proportional to income.
[ Table V here]
The coefficient on ln(health) is significantly less than zero in five out of the six regressions.
(The exception again is the regression incorporating HIV prevalence.) This implies that a worsening of health outcomes causes a country to spend less on health care. Remember that we are treating ln(health) as an endogenous variable, using a Blundell-Bond identification structure, and also that we are controlling for income. One possible explanation for the negative coefficient is that lower values of ln(health) reflect unobserved characteristics associated with a societal preference for health instead of other goods, which leads to a higher level of health expenditure. Nevertheless, we are cautious about interpreting this effect, and note that the exclusion of ln(health) from equation (2) makes no substantial difference to the other coefficients.
If health aid is fungible, then we should see a reduction in domestically funded health expenditure when aid rises; in other words,  1 should be negative. In fact, Table V shows  1 to be very close to and insignificantly different from zero. There is no evidence that health aid is fungible. Therefore, changes in health aid lead directly to changes in total health spending in recipient countries. In analyzing aid inflows, it is insufficient to consider total aid only; the composition of aid will also be important. It is the cross-country allocation of health aid, as opposed to aid in general, that is likely to have a substantial impact on health outcomes.
DISCUSSION
A substantial proportion of the variation in health aid can be explained by observable country characteristics. Understanding this variation is important, because health aid has low fungibility and its allocation therefore has a direct impact on total health expenditure in developing countries. Among the significant correlates of health aid are per capita income and country size, but also existing health outcomes, suggesting that to some extent aid allocations do respond to need.
Conditional on these factors, variations in governance also help to explain differences in aid flows. Part of the reason for an association between poor governance and declining aid flows may be that poor governance impairs the quality of donor-recipient negotiations and the efficiency of healthcare expenditure. This could explain the dependence of aid flows on the "Control of Corruption" index. However, for a given level of corruption, variations in political rights also affect aid flows. This is more likely to arise from a desire by donors to use health aid to reward political reform, rather than basing aid allocations solely on a country"s need for aid or its ability to spend aid efficiently.
Channelling health aid to countries with a good record of political reform may be an effective incentive to others to engage in similar reform. However, such a policy comes at a cost, at least in the short to medium term, since many of the countries with the worst health outcomes are also the least democratic, even if some of them are relatively uncorrupt. The policy therefore has the potential to increase global inequalities in health outcomes. The estimates are based on the Table IV model: base year = 1996, health = under-five mortality.
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